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The Sexual Politics of 
Human Cloning 
Mothering and Its Vicissitudes 
In this essay I wish to consider the sexual politics of human cloning in relation 
to alternative visions of motherhood and analyse some of the ways in which the 
advent of cloning might help change women's lives. Cloning will be seen to 
possess the potential to contribute to the encouragement of social equality and 
to the destabilisation of the long-standing patriarchal "economy of the Same," 
as Luce Irigaray describes it (1990: 74) or, alternatively, to become a genetic 
weapon of further oppression. The question thus becomes: will the availability 
of human cloning benefit women or, on the contrary, contribute to the 
perpetuation of their subordination to a still male-dominated medical and 
scientific establishment? 
W i l e  some feminists see the prospect of the implementation of human 
cloning as a threat to women, in the sense that it might rob them, as they see 
it, of their only source of power, the unique gift of motherhood, cloning might, 
on the other hand, enable both men and women to have their cloned offspring 
independently of either, thus potentially contributing to agreater equality as far 
as sex roles are concerned.' The still dominant perception that women are 
fundamentally child-carers would undergo a gradual change, since with the 
introduction of cloning and the development of artificial wombs men and 
women would be equally able to have their children with or without a 
companion of the opposite or the same sex. I believe these alterations, which 
would be operative at both a biological and a psychological level, would slowly 
create the conditions for similar job and career opportunities for both sexes, 
since women would not be limited by their anatomy to becoming mothers only 
by following the traditional modes of reproduction, unless they so chose. The 
gradual implementation of these new techniques would inevitably create a very 
different perception of parenting potential, which in turn would lead to a 
Journal ofthe Association for Research on Mothering 1 113 
Maria Aline Seabra Ferreira 
wholly distinct psychological map for humanity. This new context could no 
longer be articulated in terms of Freudian explanatory principles as far as 
human traumas, drives, perversions and taboos are concerned, butwould come 
to reflect radically altered family, social, political and urban circumstances. 
I would like to argue thus that recent developments in reproductive 
technologies might, provided that women struggle to attain their legitimate 
place as active agents in the decision-making processes, where they are glaringly 
under-represented, decisively pave the road to concrete and far-reaching 
changes to women's lives. These new techniques, amongst which I will stress 
human cloning, have opened up the prospect of a revolutionary change in the 
waywe consider sex roles and gendered conceptions of individuality, although 
a future society that included cloning technology would foreseeably look very 
different if envisioned by a woman or by a man. Indeed, as Gena Corea 
pertinently notes, "in the realm ofcloning, as in most reproductive technology, 
the male is seen as the active principle in reproduction, the female the passive" 
(1985: 261). She suggests that if it ever became possible, cloning might be 
predominantly used to promote male urges to self-generate, circumventing the 
woman's participation. As Corea remarks, "this is the classic patriarchal myth 
of single parenthood by the male" (1985; 260), a scenario which is given 
fictional illustration in, for instance, Fay Weldon's The Cloning ofJoanna May 
(1989) and in Anna Wilson's Haf~hin~Stones(1991). I wish to contest this view 
by offering and critically examining instances of women's reflections around 
such visions. I have to acknowledge, however, that it seems likely that if men 
retain the control of sexual politics, given that they will inevitably be reshaped 
by these novel reproductive conditions, it seems likely that the feasibility of 
human cloning and the introduction of ectogenetic births2 might be used to the 
furthering of a masculinist political agenda and not be put at the service of 
women's goals and aspirations. 
Since my emphasis in this essay falls on the potential benefits the 
participation ofwomen in the technological arena may bring to women's lives, 
I situate myself clearly on the side of such "technophiles," to borrow Nancy 
Lublin's word (1998: 23), as Shulamith FirEstone and Donna Haraway, whose 
theories I will privilege to help buttress my argument. Lublin defines feminist 
technophilia as a "veneration for technology because ofthe belief that it will free 
women from the burden ofreproduction, the primary source ofour oppression" 
and "technophiles" as those feminist thinkers "who are enthusiastic about the 
supposedly emancipatory nature of technology" (1998: 23). Opposed to these 
technophiles stand the technophobes, who believe that intervention in repro- 
ductive technologies is inherently anti-women. Feminists like Susan Griffin 
(1984), Mary Daly (1986), and Adrienne Rich (1992) emphasize woman's 
arguably closer connection with nature and celebrate women's bodies as the 
source ofpleasure and not of oppression, indeed as weapons in the struggle for 
liberation, in direct opposition to Firestone's (1972) and Harawaqs (1991) 
argumentation, a position I consider reductionist and e~sentialist.~ 
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Shulamith Firestone's u top ian  vision 
In her radical feminist book The Dialectic $Sex: The Casefor Feminist 
Revolution (1970), significantly dedicated to Simone de Beauvoir, for whom 
woman's biology and reproductive capacities were also the main causes of her 
oppression, Shulamith Firestone put forward the general outlines for a future 
society where women would have the same privileges and prerogatives as men, 
not being "slaves" to their biological destiny, passive vessels and "two-legged 
wombs," to use Margaret Atwood's haunting description of women in The 
Handmaid's Tale (1991:146). Not surprisingly, Firestone advocated as an 
unavoidable cornerstone of her vision the absolute necessity of freeing women 
"from the tyranny of their biology by any means available, and the diffusion of 
the childbearing and childrearing role to the society as a whole, to men and 
other children as well aswomen" (1972: 238), inwhatwould amount to aradical 
rewriting of Freud's script according to which "anatomy is destiny." Firestone's 
book recognizes a causal relation between woman's biology, her reproductive 
capabilities, and the sexual division of labour. In her political subordination to 
men, women can be equated to the working class in capitalist society. Using 
Marx (1976) and Engels's (1986) dialectical and materialist method to analyse 
the "dynamics of sex warn (Firestone, 1972: 2) and the conditions necessary to 
effect a feminist revolution, Firestone at the same time criticizes what she 
considers as the shortcomings of the communist theory as far as the oppression 
of women as a group in the arena of the class struggle is concerned. As she 
remarks, "an economic diagnosis traced to ownership of the means of produc- 
tion, even of the means of reproduction, does not explain everything. There is 
a level of reality that does not stem directly from economicsn (1972: 5). 
As an alternative, Firestone suggests developing a "materialist view of 
history based on sex itself' (1972: S), performing an analysis "in which biology 
itself-procreation-is at the origin of the dualismn (1972; 8), the sex dualism 
that is represented by the two categories of woman and man. As Firestone 
pertinently argues, "unlike economic class, sex class sprang directly from a 
biological reality: men and women were created different, and not equally 
privileged" (1972: 8). As she goes on to stress, "although, as de Beauvoir points 
out, this difference of itself did not necessitate the development of a class 
system-the domination of one group by another-the reproductiveJirnctions 
of these differences did" (1972: 8). I t  is in this context that, drawing on Biblical 
imagery, Firestone praises the liberating potential of technology, stressing that 
the double curse "that man would toil by the sweat of his brow in order to live, 
and woman would bear children in pain and travail" (1972: 242) would be lifted 
through technology. As Nancy Chodorow in related vein argues: 'Women's 
mothering is central to the sexual division oflabor. Women's maternal role has 
profound effects on women's lives, on ideology about women, on the reproduc- 
tion of masculinity and sexual inequality, and on the reproduction ofparticular 
forms of labor power. Women as mothers are pivotal actors in the sphere of 
social reproduction" (1984: 11). 
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For women to repossess their bodies, Firestone argues, a formidable 
upheaval in societal structures and engagement with technology is hndamen- 
tal. Pushing further the parallels with Marxism she has been using, Firestone 
forcefully declares that: 
Just as to assure elimination of economic classes requires the revolt of 
the underclass (the proletariat) and, in a temporary dictatorship, their 
seizure of the means of production, so to assure the elimination of 
sexual classes requires the revolt of the underclass (women) and the 
seizure of control of reproduction: not only the full restoration to 
women of ownership of their own bodies, but also their (temporary) 
seizure of control of human f e r t i l i y the  new population biology as 
well as all the social institutions of childbearing and chiidrearing. 
(1972: 10-1i14 
In polemical vein, Firestone goes on to maintain that "the end goal of 
feminist revolution must be . . . not just the elimination of maleprivilege but of 
the sex distinction itselE genital differences between human beings would no 
longer matter culturally" (1972: 11). 
Firestone further elaborates on this revolutionary vision putting forward 
what she considers as the desirable measures that would have to be imple- 
mented in order to achieve her blueprint for an egalitarian, socialist-feminist 
society. Firestone's insistence on the possibility of divorcing motherhood from 
being solely attached to woman is translated into her anticipatory fantasy 
according to which: 
The reproduction of the species by one sex for the benefit of both 
would be replaced by (at least the option of) artificial reproduction: 
children would be born to both sexes equally, or independently of 
either, however one chooses to look at it; the dependence of the child 
on the mother (and vice versa) would give way to a greatly shortened 
dependence on a small group of others in general, and any remaining 
inferiority to adults in physical strength would be compensated for 
culturally. The division of labor would be ended by the elimination of 
labor altogether (c~bernation). The tyranny of the biological.family 
would be broken. (1972:ll) 
As Firestone cogently observes, the end of the tyranny of the biological 
family would also spell the cessation of the "psychology of power'' (1972: 11) 
on which it is grounded. Female biology, then, would no longer mean 
motherhood as the only destiny open to most women. 
This amounts indeed to a revolutionary vision, contested by, amongst 
others, Adrienne Rich who, in spite of her anti-technological stance, similarly 
engages with Marxist rethoric in terms which are strongly reminiscent of 
11 6 I Volume 4, Number l 
The Sexual Politics of Human Cloning 
Firestone's when she argues: 
The repossession by women of our bodies will bring far more essential 
change to human society than the means of production by workers. 
The female body has been both territory and machine, virgin wilder- 
ness to be exploited and assembly-line turning out life. We need to 
imagine a world in which every woman is the presiding genius of her 
own body. (1972: 230) 
Unlike de Beauvoir (1977) and Firestone, however, Rich (1992) consid- 
ers the experience of motherhood as a fundamental reservoir of pleasure and 
power. According to Rich, not only do not women's biology and her repro- 
ductive capacities necessarily lead to oppression, but they can be a potent 
source of jouissance, of libidinal pleasure, an aspect which is not taken into 
account either by de Beauvoir or Firestone. In turn, Christine Battersby's 
argument in The Phenomenal Woman (1998) works as a partial corrective to 
de Beauvoir's and Firestone's demand for a radical alteration of and alterna- 
tive to the vision and representation of woman's body as exclusively devoted 
to pregnancy and maternity. Battersby's feminist metaphysics includes "an 
emphasis on birth" (1998: 4) and, in her book, Battersby explores "the 
theoretical grounding of a self which is bornn (1998: 4). As Battersby ac- 
knowledges, "women have very good reasons to feel uncomfortable with any 
attempt to link female identity to reproductive capacities" (1998: 5). How- 
ever, as she goes on to asssert, "the hypothetical link between 'woman' and 
'birth' that matters is 'If it is a male human, it cannot give birth', not 'If it is 
a female human, it can give b i r t h  (1998: 4). Battersby further argues that 
"the dominant metaphysics of the West have been developed fiom the point 
of view of an identity that cannot give birth, so that birthing is treated as a 
deviation of the 'normal' models of identity--not integral to thinking identity 
itself' (1998: 4). What I wish to stress here, in response to Christine Battersby's 
feminist metaphysics, is the need to start theorizing the ,patterns of 
individuation and identity of a being who might literally not be born,5 but 
rather develop inside an artificial womb.6 
The fact that there are two virtually opposed views about women's 
reproductive powers and how society should deal with them, however, does not 
mean that Firestone's (1972) radically new concept ofwoman's role in society 
cannot coexist with more traditional feminine participation in procreation and 
chiidrearing. On  the one hand, there are those feminist thinkers who, like 
Adrienne Rich (1992), see woman's biology and her chiidbearing responsibili- 
ties as conducive to a sense of empowerment over their own bodies and, to a 
certain extent, over men. However, in this respect we need to askwhy, then, in 
spite of the traditional sacralization of motherhood, women are very often 
drastically restricted in their societal expectations precisely because of those 
very reproductive capabilities. As Rosalind PollackPetcheskypertinently asks: 
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Can feminism reconstruct ajoyful sense ofchildbearing and maternity 
without capitulating to ideologies that reduce women to a maternal 
essence? Can we talk about morality in reproductive decision-making 
without invoking the spectre of maternal duty? (1998: 79) 
It is these problems that both Firestone (1972) and Haraway (1991), in 
their different theoretical strategies and practical suggestions, try to solve. 
"Not of woman born" 
Donna Haraway's "ironic political myth" (1991:149) ofwhich the cyborg 
is the main protagonist, provides a series of helpful ideas that can be said to 
roughly work in the same direction as some of the possibilities that human 
cloning holds for women in terms of a political strategy to help furthering their 
position in a masculinist society. 
According to Haraway, cyborgs7 "have more to do with regeneration and 
are suspicious of the reproductive matrix of most birthing" (1991: 181), a 
scenario that is dramatized in for instance Marge Piercy's Mattapoinsett 
section in Woman on the Edge ofTime (1983) and Lisa Tuttle's (1998) 'World 
of Strangers," where "the reproductive matriiofmostbirthing"is deconstructed. 
I thus situate my argument about the potentially empowering consequences for 
women of human cloning along the lines laid down by Haraway, who describes 
her cyborg myth as being about "transgressed boundaries, potent fusions, and 
dangerous possibilities which progressive people might explore as one part of 
needed political work" (1 991:154). 
Donna Haraway analyzes scientific discourses as both constructed and as 
"instruments for enforcing meanings" (1991: 164). In tune with Firestone 
(1972), Haraway argues that "one important route for reconstructing socialist- 
feminist politics is through theory and practice addressed to the social relations 
of science and technology, including crucially the systems of myth and 
meanings structuring our imagination" (1991: 163). The relations between 
science and technology constitute a material reality which women need to be 
aware o+not fear or disparage. These relations are "rearranging" categories of 
race, sex and class; feminism needs to take this into account. Indeed, Haraway's 
analysis of "women in the integrated circuitn tries to suggest, without relying 
too much on the category of "woman" (as a natural category), that as technolo- 
gies radically restructure "life" on earth, "women" do not, and are not, through 
education and training, learning to control these technologies, to "read these 
webs ofpower" (1991: 170).Asocialist-feminist politics must therefore address 
these restructurings. As Haraway pertinently points out: 'Who controls the 
interpretation of bodily boundaries in medical hermeneutics is a major feminist 
issue" (1991: 160). Her often reiterated exhortation for women to participate 
in the making ofscience is inextricablylinkedwith the control ofwebs ofpower, 
- 
since it is "the production of science and technology that constructs scientific- 
technical discourses, processes, and objects" (1991: 169) and is instrumental in 
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the creation of "the new world, just as it has participated in maintaining the old 
one" (1991: 68). 
In related vein, Haraway addresses the issue of women's victimization, 
remarking that the traditional plots that shape western culture 
are ruled by a reproductive politic-rebirth without flaw, perfection, 
abstraction. In this plot women are imagined either better or worse 
off, but all agree they have less selfhood, weaker individuation, more 
fusion to the oral, to Mother, less at stake in masculine autonomy, a 
route that does not pass through Woman, Primitive, Zero, the Mirror 
Stage and its imaginary. It passes through women and other present- 
tense, illegitimate cyborgs, not of Woman born, who refuse the ideo- 
logical resources of victimization so as to have a real life. (1991: 177) 
[emphasis mine] 
Haraway's discussion of cyborg politics, although not referring to human 
cloning in particular, can be said to pertinently apply and buttress the argument 
I have been developing here. She states: "Sexual reproduction is one kind of 
reproductive strategy among many, with costs and benefits as a function of the 
system environment. Ideologies of sexual reproduction can no longer reason- 
ably call on notions of sex and sex role as organic aspects in natural objects like 
organisms and families" (1991: 162). From this perspective, then, human 
cloning, I believe, can be seen as a potentially liberating alternative to the rigid 
boundaries imposed on women by those ideologies of sexual reproduction. 
Firestone's "cybernetic feminism" (1972: 238) and Haraway's vision of a 
"socialist-feminist culture" (150) can then be brought together in a productive 
symbiosis which will help us reflect on the fictional works named above which, 
through prophetically anticipating many medical and technological procedures 
and their repercussions on human life will provide an invaluable imaginative 
blueprint with which to critically assess imminent developments and their 
implications as far as the sexual politics of the near future are concerned. 
W o m e n ' s  science, women's  bodies  
The discourse of science has been the object of scrutiny on the part ofmany 
feminist critics, who have seen it as heavily male gendered and catering mostly 
to male political agendas. Evelyn Fox Keller (1984) and Sandra Harding (1992) 
are amongst the most influential critics ofwhat they see as the sexist way science 
has operated so far. Drawing principally on the work of Nancy Chodorow 
(1984) and Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976), one of Evelyn Fox Keller's main 
arguments is that the predominant philosophy of science practices and tech- 
niques is strongly masculine and individualistic. In order to counterbalance that 
attitude Fox Keller, like Haraway, calls for a greater participation ofwomen in 
the research and practice of science so that those sexist paradigms can be 
changed.' 
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Sandra Harding, for her part, argues for the need "to produce a feminist 
science-one that better reflects the world around us than the incomplete and 
distorting accounts provided by traditional social scienceJ' (1992: 318), taking 
into account the specifics ofgender, race and class, which inevitablygive form 
to one's experience of the world around us. Following on from this insight, 
Harding defends a type of scientific practice based on an ethics of care, of 
greater relational habits not grounded on exploitation and, like Fox Keller, 
alerts women to the need for a more active agency in the construction and 
practice of science. 
Evelyn Fox Keller's (1992) notion of a gender-neutral science found a 
strongly receptive echo in many feminist activists, who demand the kind of 
policy that will be sympathetic to women's needs and aspirations. Indeed, as 
Catherine MacKinnon contends, in order for women to achieve greater control 
of their bodies and hence a greater political power to subvert male domination, 
they should be able to start exerting that control earlier. As she insists: "If 
women are not socially accorded control over sexual access to their bodies, they 
cannot control much else about them" (1993: 616). 
In this context, I believe the possibility of having their own cloned child 
would be a potential way to possess greater control over their bodies and 
reproductive choices, as I suggested above. As Michelle Stanworth in related 
vein notes, the 
thrust of feminist analysis has been to rescue pregnancy from the 
status of the "natural"-to establish pregnancy and childbirth not as 
a natural condition, the parameters ofwhich are set in advance, but as 
an accomplishment which we can actively shape according to our own 
ends. . . . In the feminist critique of reproductive technologies, it is not 
technology as an art$icialinvasion ofthe human bodythat is at issue- 
but whether we can create the political and cultural conditions in 
which such technologies can be employed by women to shape the 
experience of reproduction according to their own definitions. (1987: 
34-35) 
Indeed, it is never too much to stress that cloning would only be l l l y  
empowering for women if it went on a parwith social and economic independ- 
ence, as well as political parity, so as to ensure that women's problems would 
receive the adequate amount of attention that would go with appropriate 
representation in the institutional organs with power of decision. This aspect 
is equally stressed byMichele Barrettwho, in Women's Oppression Today(1980), 
obsenres that "theway in which the biology ofhuman reproduction is integrated 
into social relations is not a biological question: it is apolitical issue" (1980: 76). 
Similar concerns are articulated by Firestone who acknowledges that 
though the sex class system may have originated in fundamental 
120 1 Volume 4, Number l 
The Sexual Politics $Human Cloning 
biological conditions, this does not guarantee, once the biological 
basis of their oppression has been swept away, that women and 
children will be freed. On the contrary, the new technology, especially 
fertility control, may be used against them to reinforce the entrenched 
system of exploitation. (1972: 10) 
This powerful call for woman's effective participation in medicine, biology 
and in all the stages of the decision making process is one of the most forcefully 
articulated requirements put forward by feminists in their struggle for social 
equity and justice. Hilary Rose is similarly critical of the "pervasive conserva- 
tism [which] lies at the heart of the debate about the so-called new challenges 
to ethics posed by the new science and technology ofreproduction" (1998: 172). 
As she goes on to observe, the "problem for feminists is that we want to resist 
specific oppressive technologies while at the same time working to change 
nothing less than the values and structures of science. Thus our debates must 
be located within an understanding of the biologically determinist direction of 
modern science and medicine which contain within them faed notions of 
woman's and man's natures" (1998: 172). 
In related vein, Luce Irigaray, whose trajectory includes a long-standing 
involvementwith the Italian feminist communists and thewomen ofthe Italian 
left-wing parties, as well as with issues relatedwith women's bodily experiences, 
is worried that instead of helping to free women from their subordination to 
patriarchy, the recent reproductive technologies might further accentuate the 
traditional view that "the framework for women's existence is exclusively 
maternal" (1993a: 135). Irigaray further remarks that "there's a real risk that 
some women, who call themselves freed from their nature such as it was defined 
by patriarchy, will once again subject themselves body and "soul" to this variant 
on their fate called artificial procreationn (1993a: 135). Irigaray's doubts find 
powerful vocalization: 
Test-tube mothers, surrogate mothers, men engendering futuristi- 
cally (in their intestines): what next?Wi all this help us get away from 
the pressure to have children, our sole sexual "vocation" according to 
the patriarchs, so as to get to know ourselves, to love and create 
ourselves in accordance to our bodily differences? (1993a: 135). 
Cloning, I believe, would provide a possible answer to Irigarays distrust of 
some new reproductive technologies, which she fears might go on reproducing 
the same male webs of power? Indeed, in "So When Are We to Become 
Women?" Irigaray observes: 
Todays scientists poring over their test tubes to decide a woman's 
fertility or fertilization very much resemble theologians speculating 
about the possibility of a female soul or about the point at which the 
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fetus' soul comes into existence. The approach is similar, perhaps 
worse. And if need be, some ofthese scientistswill be women. (1993a: 
134-135) 
The prospect ofhuman cloning has effectively forced renewed attention on 
the sexual politics of reproductive technologies as well as the potential social 
and family-related scenarios they may bring about. 
Motherhood deconstructed 
Motherhood, as has often been noted, has served throughout the ages to 
glorify woman as mother, but at the same time to subordinate her according to 
the argument that as men cannot biologically fulfi the function of bearing a 
child, woman has to consecrate most of her time, as well as her ambitions and 
inclinations, to the higher good of society, its perpetuation and well-being.1° 
In Patterns $Dissonance, Rosi Braidotti points out that woman, "whether 
she likes it or not, only exists in her culture as a potential mother" (1991: 260), 
a factwhich, ifit has been the source ofone ofthe only avenues to empowerment 
women have experienced throughout the ages, has also simultaneously consti- 
tuted the basis of their enslavement to anatomy. As Julia Kristeva in related vein 
observes: 
If it is not possible to say of a woman what she is (without running the 
risk of abolishing her difference), would it perhaps be different 
concerning the mother, since that is the only function of the 'other sex' 
to which we can definitely attribute existence? And yet, there too, we 
are caught in a paradox. (1987: 234) 
These difficulties inherent in the contested site that is motherhood and 
the many theorizations surrounding it are described by Patrice DiQuinzio as 
precisely a "paradoxical politics of mothering" (1999: xvii), one which would 
"take up a wide variety of issues related to conception, pregnancy, birth, and 
child rearing, but it would recognize that it cannot offer a completely coherent 
and consistent position on these issuesn (1999: 248). The advent of the new 
reproductive technologies we have been alluding to would bring into greater 
relief many of the paradoxes attendant upon these various conceptions of 
motherhood. 
With human cloning and ectogenesis, as well as the sharing of the 
reproductive capacity with men, I believe that instead of relinquishing the 
source of power that motherhood has been perceived in some respects as 
yielding, as some critics would argue," women would, on the contrary, achieve 
a greater equality by dint of that very interchange of roles, in particular if and 
when ectogenesis became the norm.12 The politics of motherhood, thus, would 
necessarily undergo drastic changes, as would the dynamics of the nuclear 
family. 
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Woman has been for so long inextricably associated with motherhood that 
to contemplate the idea of woman as non-mother would appear as a scandal, 
socially unacceptable, impossibly revolutionary and potentially deeply threat- 
ening to the patriarchal stronghold.13 Cloning technology applied to human 
beings would thus predictably have far-reaching effects in all social and family 
dynamics. Men who decided to have cloned offspring, and assuming that 
artificial wombs would be available, could thus choose to have their child 
completely on their own, as if there were no women in the world. Conversely, 
a woman could do exactly the same, and much earlier, since she would not have 
to depend on ectogenesis to bear and give birth to a baby, if she so chose.14 These 
can be seen as very powerful motivating factors that might lead a woman to opt 
for having a cloned child, brought to term inside her own womb or in an 
artificial one, circumstances that would potentially and gradually lead to a 
greater parity with men and equality of opportunities for women in the social 
structure, as I have been arguing. 
This relative symmetry in access to reproductive roles could lead, nonethe- 
less, to a   re dominance of a masculinist political agenda, as already mentioned, 
perpetuating the status quo of men in an androcentric society. As J. Raymond 
observes, the new reproductive techniques can be seen as a powerful means for 
men to wrest "not only control of reproduction, but reproduction itself' (1985: 
12) from women, apoint that is also stressed by Michelle Stanworth, who notes 
that new reproductive technologies "are the vehicle that will turn men's 
illusions of reproductive power into a reality" (1987: 16).15 The implications 
embedded in these developments as far as women and pregnancy are concerned 
are thus much more extensive than the consideration of their biological 
consequences might lead us to suspect. As Michelle Stanworth goes on to note, 
in tune with my reflections mentioned above, "motherhood as a unified 
biological process will be effectively deconstructed" (1987: 16).16 
I believe it is essential, when we stand at the threshold of a new era where 
different versions o f  Brave New Worlds," to borrow Aldous Huxley's resonant 
words, will necessarily emerge, to anticipate and examine at least the general 
outlines these societal configurations might take.17 
Conclusion 
From the perspective I have been presenting, human cloning can be seen 
to constitute a very important and empowering step forward for women, a 
fundamental strategic move on the way to egalitarian rights with men. Might 
cloning be in fact one of the stepping stones to enable such egalitarianism to 
gradually arise? I tend to believe so, as long as it is used with the necessary 
caution and common sense with respect to the unavoidable ethical and moral 
issues. As many critics have abundantly stressed, however, women have to 
play an actively participatory role in the forging and implementation of new 
technological advances in science in general and in the networks of power. 
There is a pressing need to reverse Haraways pessimistic position according 
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to which there is no place for woman in these networks, "only geometries of 
difference and contradiction crucial to women's cyborg identities, If we learn 
how to read these webs of power and social life, we might learn new cou- 
plings, new coalitions" (1991: 170). Woman's insertion in these webs of 
power, her greater agency in the scientific and medical arenas, constitute a 
fundamental step towards the implementation of a political agenda that will 
contemplate women's welfare and potential new reproductive scenarios in our 
cyberspace age. 
In "Stabat Mater," Kristeva claims that "motherhood . . . today remains, 
afier the Virgin, without a discoursen (1987: 262). With cloning, however, the 
fantasy of avirgin maternal might come to be fulfilled, providing a revolution- 
ary new vision to the concept of motherhood and potentially enabling new 
feminine discourses to arise, alongside Kristeva's call for a "herethicsn (1987: 
263). As Toril Moi similarly stresses, with relation to "Stabat Mater," "there is 
... an urgent need for a 'post-virginal' discourse on maternity, one which 
ultimatelywouldprovide bothwomen and men with a newethicsn (1986: 161). 
Following on from Kristeva's exhortation for the necessity of revising the 
cult of the Virgin Marywhile retaining some ofits empowering aspects, I wish 
to end this essay by suggesting that many threads of that new discourse on 
motherhood already exist, as I hope has become clear, and will in all likelihood 
be greatly added to with the inevitable reflections and theorizations that will 
accompany the advent of human cloning. 
At the end of her bookAlone OfAIIHer Sex, Marina Warner remarks that 
"as an acknowledged creation of Christian mythology, the Virgin's legend will 
endure in its splendour and lyricism, but it will be emptied of moral signifi- 
cance, and thus lose its present real powers to heal and to harm" (2000: 339). 
It seems to me that, contrary to Warner's predictions, the impact of human 
cloning for women in particular is likely to add a renewed vigour to the iconic 
figure of the Virgin Mary, turning her into a potent symbol of stimulating and 
reinvented potentialities for women. 
'The prospect of the introduction of human cloning has produced heated 
debate and widespread criticism. Amongst the most salient concerns cloning 
has elicited can be cited the link between cloning and eugenic thinking, raising 
fears of elimination of those deemed less valuable as well as the creation and 
reproduction of certain genotypes, possibilities that could lead to a profusion 
of designer babies and, given time, to a much more uniform population pool. 
The power to choose who to clone and what characteristics designer babies 
should possess is inextricably linked with economic and political privilege, 
leaving out a large part of the world population and inevitably leading to 
discrimination and imbalances in terms of skin colour and related ethnic issues. 
Human cloning also raises numerous ethical and religious questions, which 
address such notions as the inviolable uniqueness of an individual, family 
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dynamics and the laws that regulate the familyunit, as well as what is perceived 
by some as the highly transgressive act of daring to create life, a gift exclusive 
to God. For extended discussion of these issues see for instance Ruth F. 
Chadwick (1987), Daniel Kevles (1997), Matha C. Nussbaum and Cass R. 
Sustein (1998), John Harris (1998), Tom L. Beauchamp and LeRoy Walters 
(1999) and Lisa Yount (2000). 
2For a full discussion of the complex questions involved in ectogenesis see, for 
instance, Susan M. Squier's Babies in Bottles (1994) and Julien S. Murphvs "Is 
Pregnancy Necessary? Feminist Concerns About Ectogenesis" (1998). 
3I find these technophobic arguments too dependent on essentialist notions of 
woman and nature, treating culture and technology as the inevitable enemies 
of that implied connection with the natural world, itselfunavoidably enmeshed 
in binary, exclusionary dualisms. As I wish to argue, science and technology can 
benefit women immensely, if developed and applied according to ethical rules 
drafted by committees in which both men and women are equally represented. 
4These changes would only happen gradually. Apocalyptic visions of armies of 
cloned people being "fabricated" for specific purposes is clearly not a part of 
Firestone's (1972) project, which considers versions of cloning as enabling 
women to bypass the seemingly inevitable fate their biological position dictates 
for them. 
'This much needed theorization remains, however, beyond the scope of this 
essay. 
6From which that baby would subsequently be "decanted," to borrow the 
pejorative terminology Aldous Huxley used in Brave New World. 
'I am here assimilating clones with cyborgs, since the former are the result of 
laboratory manipulation of cells. 
5 e e  for instance her Refections on Gender andscience (Keller, 1984) and "From 
Secrets of Life to Secrets of Death" (Keller, 1990). 
91n a private conversation with me, in June 2001, however, Luce Irigaray 
considered the prospect of cloning as "sad" in terms of social and family life. 
''Thus implicitly suggesting that in spite of their alleged superiority men are 
often found defficient in providing a smoothly running environment for their 
home and children. Dorothy Dinnerstein (1976), Jane Gallop (1982), and 
Nancy Chodorow (1978) offer a pertinent critique of patriarchal patterns of 
socialization in the traditional nuclear family. Chodorow in particular force- 
fully argues the case for a much greater participation of the father in the raising 
of the children and the running of the household. 
''Amongst these could be cited Renate Duelli Klein (1985), Gena Corea 
(1985a and 1985b), Roberta Steinbacher (1985); with Helen Holmes (1998), 
Rita Arditti (1984) and Arditti et al. (1985). 
121t goes without saying that these potentialities would similarly provide men 
with the possibility of having their own children without a woman's help, thus 
putatively originating the development of an imbalance in the relative number 
of male and female births, on the one hand, as in Anna Wilson's dystopian novel 
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Hatching Stones and on the other hand the appropriation, or rather, perpetua- 
tion of the power of decision over the hture shape of society ifwomen are not 
equally at the centre of the processes of decision-making. This is obviously an 
extreme scenario, just as the idea that given these tantalizing possibilities 
women would immediately avail themselves of these opportunities and decide 
not to become pregnant any more, leaving to the laboratory and the artificial 
womb the task of bearing their children. This futuristic prospect is many 
decades away, which is not to say that in the relatively near future manywomen 
might not be able to decide, for medical or other reasons, to profit from these 
new resources, if indeed they become available. 
I3In "Motherhood: The Annihilation of Women," Jeffner Allen rejects moth- 
erhood "on the grounds that motherhood is dangerous to womenn (1984: 315) 
and argues the case for a "philosophy of evacuation" (1984: 315), which 
"proposes women's collective removal of ourselves from all forms of mother- 
hood" (1984: 315). As Allen explains the rationale behind her statement: 
"Freedom is never achieved by the mere inversion of an oppressive construct, 
that is, by seeing motherhood in a 'ned light. Freedom is achieved when an 
oppressive construct, motherhood, is vacated by its members and thereby 
rendered null and void" (1984: 315). 
141 am assuming here that probably the technology for cloning a human being 
may predictably be developed before artificial wombs become ready for use, 
indispensable for men to have their cloned babies. 
15This scenario is given fictional illustration in for example Maureen Duffy's 
Gor Saga (1981) and Fay Weldon's The Cloning ofJoanna May (1989). 
161n this context, surrogate motherhood is a case in point. In her discussion of 
surrogacy Lori B. Andrews (1998) considers that the arguments brought to 
bear on this question are predominantly political and have to do with the 
fundamental issue ofwhether the government should have an ascendency over 
women's bodies and regulate them, as is the case with surrogacy. As Andrews 
synthesizes her position: "Some feminists have criticized surrogacy as turning 
participating women, albeit with their consent, into reproductive vessels. I see 
the danger ofthe antisurrogacy arguments as potentially turning allwomen into 
reproductive vessels, without their consent, by providinggovernment oversight 
for women's decisions and creating a disparate legal category for gestation. 
Moreover, by breathing life into arguments that feminists have put to rest in 
other contexts, the current rationales opposing surrogacy could undermine a 
larger feminist agenda" (1998: 168). 
''Some fictional accounts which illustrate different versions of the potential 
scenarios human cloning might give rise to include, amongst others: Mary E. 
Bradley Lane's Mizora (1890), Charlotte Perkins Gilman's Herland (1915), 
Gwyneth Jones's Divine Endurance (1984), Joanna Russ's The Female Man 
(1975), Naomi Mitchison's Solution Three (1975), Pamela Sargent's Cloned 
Lives (1976), Kate Wilhelm's Where Late the Sweet Birds Sang (1977), James 
Tiptree Jr's "Houston, Houston, Can You Read?" (1976), SallyMiller Gearhart's 
126 1 Volume 4, Number 1 
The Sexual Politics of Human Cloning 
The Wanderground (l978),  Suzy McKee Charnas's Motherlines (1978), Marge 
Piercy's Woman on the Edge $Time (1983), Joan Slonczewski's A Door Into 
Ocean (1986), Sheri Tepper, The Gate t o  Women's Country (1988), Anna 
Wilson's Hatching Stones (1991), Fay Weldon's The Cloning $Joanna May 
(1993) and Lisa Tuttle's 'World of Strangers" (1998). 
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